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FORWARD 
On April 13, 1976,President Gerald R. Ford signed into law 
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 USC 1801). 
This Act represents a turning point in domestic fisheries manage-
ment and will prove equally significant in its effect on inter-
national relations. The Act contains two major features. One 
concerns the development of a domestic management n~gime. The 
other deals with the unilateral assertion of a fishery conserva-
tion zone extending seaward to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline of the territorial seaft The passage of this 
act will create significant social, economic, legal, and political 
impacts throughout the fishing industry, the nation, and the world. 
On Marr.h 1.8, 1976, several weeks before ~he signing of the 
Act, a group of experts representing various levels of government, 
fisheries management, economics, law, and science, convened for a 
panel discussion of extended fisheries jurisdiction. This panel 
discussion will undoubtedly be one of many such discussions seeking 
to understand and deal with the far-reaching domestic and inter-
national implications of extended fisheries jurisdiction. 
It is hoped that the publication of these presentations will 
provide those interested in fisheries management with an understanding 
of events leading to the enactment of the Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 and an appreciation of its implications. 
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SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION 
by 
William Brewer 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Since my colleagues on the panel today are better qualified 
than I am to discuss the international and economic implications of 
extended jurisdiction, and to consider !ts effects on the states, I 
would like to discuss with you some of the background of R.R. 200, 
which will shortly be enacted by the Congress and w:lll in all likeli-
hood be signed by the President. I would like to d:lscuss in very 
broad terms some of its provisions, and finally mention a few of the 
significant legal problems which I see arising out of the legal rela-
tionships which it creates. 
Here, at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, one does not 
need to go over the history of the fisheries as a common resource, 
nor the technical developments which have proliferated in the last 
ten years and resulted in the catching capacity of the world's 
fishing fleets exceeding the productive ability of most of the world's 
fish resources. It has become common knowledge that practically all 
of the marine species which are preferred by man are in greater or 
lesser trouble from fishing pressure. It is also common knowledge that, 
although the United States is a party to some 20 fishing treaties and 
executive agreements, with many similar arrangements existing 
between nations in other parts:of the world., the depletion of 
our fish resources continues to accelerate. Many improvements have 
been made in the treaties to which we are a party, the International 
Convention on the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) being perhaps the 
most advanced, but even there the pace of agreement lags behind the 
problem. 
Coastal nations themselves have been equally unsuccessful in 
dealing with the problem of conservation of marine fisheries. The 
1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing, which became ef f E~ctive in 1966, 
permitted the coastal nation to take non-discriminatory action to 
conserve fish stocks off its coasts. But it sufferE~d from two fatal 
defects: first, the failure of the important fishing nations of Japan 
and the Soviet Union to adhere to the treaty, and SE~cond, the require-
ment that such measures be non-discriminatory, in other words, that 
foreign fishermen be treated on the same basis as fishermen of the 
coastal nation. As a result, no nation has ever implemented this 
provision of the treaty. 
A new and separate mode of dealing with the problem started with 
the Truman Proclamation of 1945, which asserted the ownership of the 
United States over the living and non-living resources of the continental 
shelf~ This principle was taken and expanded by the west coast 
countries of South America by a unilateral claim to a 200-mile 
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territorial sea. Although recognition of their claim was withheld 
by the United States and most other countries, the trend was not to 
be denied, and it has resulted in nea1;-agreement at the Law 
of the Sea Conference on a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, as well 
as the unilateral claim of 200-mile economic jurisdiction which is 
found in the bill which will soon be enacted by the Congress of the 
United States. 
I think you are all aware that at present there is no general 
domestic fisheries management legislation. A number of measures do 
exist which deal with specialized areas. For example, our treaties 
and Executive agreements have generally been followed by implementing· 
legislation. Examples of this are the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Act of 1950, implementing ICNAF, and the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, 
which implements the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention. Species 
which are endangered, and those which have captured our collective 
imaginations, receive special protection in the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. Foreign 
fishing has been prohibited, .although not managed, in the three-mile 
territorial sea and in the exclusive fisheries zone extending nine 
miles beyond the territorial sea. The Bartlett Act, in addition to 
prohibiting Bu.ch foreign fishing, makes it equally unlawful to take 
the living resources of the continental shelf, to which claim is laid 
by the Truman Proclamation, later enforced by the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. Management authority, and indeed ownership, 
of the resources within three miles, which were originally claimed 
for the United States by the Supreme Court in 1947, have been given 
back to the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. 
An attempt at general fisheries management legislation was made 
in 1973 when Representative Dingell introduced a bill known- as the 
High Seas Fisheries Conservation Act. This was of course applicable 
only to foreign fishermen in the nine-mile contiguous zone, but it 
was intended to lay the groundwork for future extension of jurisdiction. 
It failed because of a feeling on the part of the industry that 
American fishermen would be regulated beyond nine miles while foreign 
fishermen would not. A similar management measure was introduced by 
Senator Magnuson and others in the Senate in 1974, but this time it 
was coupled with the unilaterial assertion of 200-mile jurisdiction, 
and the bill was enacted by the Senate. It attracted strong 
Administration opposition because of the feared consequence to our 
negotiating position at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, which was then, and is now, in progress. These efforts were 
successful in preventing the bill from reaching the House of Representatives 
and it died with the end of the 93rd Congress. However, the strategy 
of combining 200-mile jurisdiction, which was desired by most if not all 
fishermen, with a management bill, which was generally disliked 
although grudgingly admitted to be necessary at some point, proved to 
be successful. There was little opposition to the combined bill from 
fishing industry sources. 
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In the 94th Congress starting in 1975 there was a tidal wave of 
support for 200-mile legislation. H.R. 200, introduced by Representative 
Studds of Massachusetts and co-sponsored by many other Representatives, 
passed in October by a vote of 208 to 101. The simi.lar S. 961, 
introduced by Senator Magnuson of Washington and eighteen other Senators, 
passed in January of 1976 by a vote of 77 to 19. After the Congressional 
recess in early February, a committee of conference was appointed, and 
went promptly to work. Most of the major issues were settled by the 
conferees at two meetings on February 24th and 26th. A combined staff 
of half a dozen attorneys then began regular meetings to generate a 
conference text and to settle between them numerous other discrepancies 
and problems. At this point, the advice of the Exec.utive agencies 
was solicited and was freely provided. I think it i.s fair to say that 
the advice of these agencies, and I can speak partic.ularly for our own, 
has been helpful in foreseeing and eliminating many future problems, and 
there has been an excellent relationship between the: staffs and the 
agencies in dealing with these problems. By and large, the technical 
advice of the agencies has been accepted except in c.ases where it con-
flicts with the clear political decision of the conferees. This is of 
course the way the conference committee should work. What may be the 
last meeting of the conferees was scheduled to take place on Wednesday, 
March 17th~ 
In this Congress the Administration's position on the bill changed 
quite markedly. If the Congress would delay impleme:ntation of the 
200-mile provision until 1977, thus giving the LOS Conference a chance 
to reach agreement this year, ~he President would si.gn. This was 
agreed, and the bill now bears an effective date of March 1, 1977. 
Relatively little interest was taken by the Administration in the manage-
ment provisions. However, Department of State, the Coast quard in the 
Department of Transporation, and of course NOAA in the Department of 
Commerce, took a very lively interest, and I think we all contributed, 
as mentioned above, to the eventual shape of the bill. Each of these 
three agencies will be given important new responsibilities: State in 
negotiating and re-negotiating fisheries agreements, Coast Guard in 
enforcing the regulations in an area of ocean two-thirds as large as 
the United States, and Commerce in its general role as the fisheries 
management agency. 
The bill as it emerged is really two measures i.n one: the assertion 
of a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone, with provisi.on for foreign 
fishing under certain prescribed circumstances, and a comprehensive 
fisheries management plan. Since I expect that one or more of my 
colleagues will discuss its international implicati.ons I would like to 
spend most of my time on the domestic aspects of the: measure. 
A fisheries conservation zone is created which extends 197 nautical 
miles beyond the boundary of the Territorial Sea. State regulation of 
fisheries within the three-mile zone, conferred upon the states by the 
Submerged Lands Act, is preserved, subject to certai.n preemption require-
ments which I will discuss further. 
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If a foreign nation desires to secure rights for its fishing 
vessels to fish within the fisheries conservation zone, it may nego-
tiate a master agreement, which essentially acknowledges the juris-
diction of the United States over the zone, and makes provision for 
the issuance of permits to individual vessels. Once admitted, 
foreign fishing vessels will be subject to the same regulations as 
domestic vessels, except that the license fee payable by foreign 
vessels will differ and will be in most cases larger. 
Certain species of fish receive special treatment under the Act. 
Anadromous species, primarily salmon, remain under U.S. management 
and ownership even when outside the U.S. fisheries zone. Whether this 
is consistent with existing international law remains to be determined. 
Highly migratory species, primarily tuna, are completely exempt from 
U.S. management authority in order to be regulated by virtue of inter-
national agreement. One exception to this statement is that existing 
state regulation of the tuna fishery conducted by the citizens of a 
particular state will conti.nue to be permitted. Finally, the continental 
shelf fisheries, primarily lobster and c~(ab, remain within the U.S. 
management authority even if 'they are located beyond the 200-mile 
zone. In fact the continental shelf does extend beyond 200 miles in a 
few places, primarily Alaska. 
Apparently because of a feeling that the Administration would be 
likely to trade away fishing privileges for other national interests, 
the conferees were determined to retain a degree of Congressional over-
sight of international fishery agreements. Such agreements must be 
tabled for sixty days before becoming effective so as to allow Con-
gressional action if desired. After toying with the idea of permitting 
implementation to be blocked by the action of a single House, wiser 
heads pointed out the constitutional difficulties involved,. and it was 
settled that Congress must act by a bill or joint resolution if an agree-
ment were to be terminated. The provision for tabling the agreement and 
for congressional action applies only to Executive agreements, since it 
was felt that the advice and consent procedure would be sufficient check-
and-balance with respect to fishing conventions. 
In designing the management procedure itself, Congress, as well as 
the conferees, sought to achieve a system of checks and balances between 
federal and state power. While we are speaking primarily of fisheries 
in federal waters, it should be recalled that there is a long tradition 
of fisheries regulation by the states, primarily the western states, 
and very little if any tradition in the f'ederal government. Note also 
the general shifting of the center of power toward state governments 
that seems to exist in 1976. As a result the bill may be somewhat 
more heavily weighted toward state authority than would have been the 
case, say, ten years ago. However, I believe the final program worked 
out is feasible, and aside from being somewhat cumbersome, does effec-
tively represent the various interests involved. 
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Management plans for the various species will be prepared by 
Regional Fisheries Management Councils, of which eight have been 
created. They recognize the regional character of the fisheries. 
Councils will represent the New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, 
Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western Pacific regions. 
They vary in size, but the general pattern is that each state in the 
region will have its principal fisheries executive on the Council, 
together with at least one other member. The regional director of 
the National Marine Fisheries Service will also be a voting member. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service, Coast Guard, and the State Department 
will have non-voting representatives, and the executive director of 
the Marine Fisheries Commission will also be a non-voting member. 
Staff and support will be provided by the Department of Commerce. 
When a management plan has been prepared, the Secretary of 
Commerce is charged with developing regulations under the plan. Both. 
the plan and the regulations must be consistent with certain national 
fisheries regulations standards which are listed in the Act and are 
very general in nature. The ·Secretary has certain specified powers 
with respect to emergency plans and regulations, with respect to the 
plans which are not consistent with the national standards, and in 
cases where the council or councils cannot agree on a management plane 
If the stock of fish which is concerned is found in part within 
state waters, 'federal regulation can preempt state regulation under 
certain clearly defined circumstances where the state regulation is 
found to be inconsistent with ;he federal plan. 
There are very broad penalty and enforcement provisions in the 
Act. Both civil and criminal penalties are provided for. .In addition, 
there is an automatic forfeiture of catch in cases of viola.tion. · 
Forfeiture of both gear and vessel is permitted by normal judicial 
forfeiture proceedings. The institution of enforcement proceedings 
is a responsibility of NOAA, while the Justice Department will, as 
usual,.handle the proceedings once the litigation stage is reached. 
At sea, the primary responsibility for enforcement is in the hands 
of the Coast Guard, requiring the extended use of VE!ssels and airplanes. 
Like NOAA, the Coast Guard has been at work for a pE!riod of at least 
two years attempting to anticipate the problems of Extended Jurisdiction 
and to plan for their additional equipment needs. It is obviously 
impossible to patrol every square mile of this larg,~ territory, so 
plans have been made to patrol selected fishing areas on a seasonal 
basis, thus getting maximum use from personnel and ,~quipment. Even with 
this limitation, the Coast Guard has requested additional ships and 
airplanes for the task. Basically this means addit:Lonal high-endurance 
cutters, and additional C-130 long-range aircraft. NOAA personnel 
will normally be on board the ships and aircraft engaged in enforcement 
work, as they are now in connection with enforcement under the various 
fisheries conventions. 
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Certain other fisheries acts have been repealed or amended to 
conform to H.R. 200. The Bartlett Act and the Contiguous Fisheries 
Zone Act have been repealed; the Marine Mammal Protection Act has 
been amended to extend its coverage to the 200-mile zone. The 
indemnity provisions for U.S. vessels under the Fishermens'Protective 
Act have been amended to provide that they will continue to be 
available under certain circumstances even though the United States 
may recognize the 200-mile jurisdiction claims of the foreign 
country involved. 
This has been, of course, a very brief treatment of a long and 
complicated piece of legislation. It should already be apparent to 
you that there will be numerous, troublesome, legal problems arising 
under it. Perhaps we have averted some of them by careful attention 
to the Act during drafting and in conference. Let me suggest to you a 
few of the problems which I see arising, without venturing answers 
at this point. 
On the international. scene, the Act provides for a determination 
of the excess stock available for foreign fishermen. Despite careful 
drafting, I foresee difficulties and possibly litigation on the amount 
of this excess. The question of negotiation with adjacent States, 
primarily Canada, is difficult to fit within the framework of the 
statute, since fisheries which are shared are frequently managed under 
the provisions of special international agreements, sometimes by 
international commissions, and the determination of foreign fishing 
rights will .equally have to be accomplished jointly. At present there 
exist slightly more than 20 fisheries treaties and agreements to which 
the U.S. is a party. The process of adjusting these as they expire 
or come up for renewal to the provisions of the Act is bound to be 
complicated and difficult. Finally, I have mentioned the difficulties 
which we may encounter under international law in asserting ownership 
and management of an anadromous species beyond the 200-mile zone. 
On the domestic front, other problems ar~ visible on the horizon. 
The relationship of the Secretary of Commerce to the Regional councils, 
especially in situations where disagreement arises as to the content 
of a management plan, has been the subject of scrutiny by the conferees 
and their staffs and by ourselves, but I doubt if every problem has 
been worked out. Since management plans and management regulations are 
treated somewhat differently under the Act, there may be valid differences 
of opinion as to which is which, and again these may be exacerbated by 
different views on the part of the Secretary and the councils. Limited 
entry programs are authorized under the bill, with the consent of a 
majority of the Council, but are certain to be opposed by fishing 
interests who desire to enter the fishery and are excluded in whole or 
in part. The question of preemption of state rights, even though 
spelled out carefully in the Act, might lead to litigation where state/ 
federal views were markedly divergent. Finally, it is more than likely 
that the resources of money and people to enforce the Act on a fully 
adequate basis will be lacking, if for no other reason than because a 
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full-scale enforcement effort designed to cover all contigencies 
would probably cost more than any possible economic benefit. In this 
case, there will be uneven enforcement, and suits to require enforce-
ment or to avoid enforcement on the basis of inequity can be anticipated. 
I hope I am not taking too gloomy a view in this list of legal 
problems, but experience suggests that any new and ce>mplicated Act, 
reaching into new fields and affecting interests and people who have 
never been regulated before, is bound to generate controversy and liti-
gation. Despite all this, those of us who are involved are moved by 
the sense of great adventure which I have alluded to in the title, the 
adventure of attempting to save a great national resource which would 
otherwise disappear, perhaps forever, and the hope of making it 
available on a self-sustaining basis to the United States and to some 
extent, to all of mankind. 
7 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION 
by 
Dr. Jackson Davis 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
For the first time in the approximately 370 years of European 
settlement of North America the United Sta.tes is attempting to address 
our fisheries problems in a concerted and organized fashion. This, 
despite the fact that fisheries were one of the features which orig-
inally attracted European colonists to this continent. St. John's 
Newfoundland, for example, has been continuously occupied by people 
of European origin since the'late 1500's and that occupation has been 
based on fisheries. We are now approaching a new r«~gime with all of 
its attendant problems and opportunities. Fisheries in the United 
States are at the dawn of a new era. 
In considering the implications of extended jurisdiction, we 
might start by asking why the Congress is contemplating extending 
jurisdiction at all? One of the reasons is, perhaps, that several 
of our neighbors to the south have done so and we f:Lnd ourselves out 
of style in the hemisphere. There are more cogent reasons than style, 
however. Many of these reasons occurred to our neighbors to the south 
sooner than they did to us, apparently. Most important among them, I 
think, is the fact that the present system, or lack of a system, has been 
unsatisfactory. The various international arrangements that bear on 
fishing problems have, in general, not satisfactorily addressed problems 
until they reached or passed the crisis stage. The International Whaling 
Commission is perhaps a good example; ICNAF is another. Both of these 
Commissions are now, I think, making very significant progress. However, 
neither was able to do so until a number of stocks were severely over-
exploited. Looking at the ICNAF situation, we see overfishing, largely 
by foreign distant water fleets, of haddock, herring, mackerel, and some 
other stocks. The domestic management has not really been any better and 
in some cases not so good as some of the international attempts at manage-
ment. For example, turning again to the ICNAF area we see that yellow-
tail flounder stocks are overfished. This has been largely a domestic 
offense rather than a foreign one. 
A difficulty with operating under current international law and 
custom and through various multilateral and bilateral agreements, is 
that these involve a certain "buying and selling"; a series of trade-
offs. The reason for this is that the interests of the participating 
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groups are rather diverse and there is no mechanism to force accommoda-
tion. Fishing strategies of the various countries differ, as do national 
and social goals and economic systems. The distant water fleets fishing 
off of our coast are concerned, of course, solely with food. They are, 
in the view of some of our people, interfering with recreational fisheries 
of considerable value both socially and economically to coastal residents 
of the U.S. It becomes very difficult to reconcile these differing 
social goals in a system in which each participant in the game has equal 
rights. No one is in a position to decide a disagreement other than by 
bartering or trading goods or concessions. So this is the difficulty 
in which we find ourselves. The fact is that attempts must be made to 
accommodate the increasing protein needs of the world population and the 
differing national and social needs to the potential yield of the fish 
stocks of the oceans. These have not been accommodated in the existing 
scheme. Therefore we are seeking something better. 
To further visualize national di~ferences in points of view con-
sider, as an example, the situation of the Soviet Union, Poland or the 
GDR fishing on the continental shelf adjacent to the East Coast. They 
fish for mackerel and sea herring primarily, two species which have not 
been of great interest to the U.S. fisheries. In the course of their 
directed fishery on mackerel and sea herring the fishing vessels of these 
countries have incidentally, almost accidentally in some cases, made 
serious inroads into stocks that are of considerable interest to or 
that are the basis of economic life of some of our coastal fishermen 
and, in some cases, entire communities. These stocks, which are not 
very large, are looked upon by the large distant water fleets as being 
nusiance fish in their operations. They would prefer clean catches of 
only one or two species. The Soviets and the Poles must think we of the 
U.S. are the craziest people in the world to devote so much attention to 
a stock of fish capable of producing perhaps 20,000 tons a year. They 
are interested in stocks from which they can expect to take 100 to 200 
thousand tons a year. These small stocks which are so important to 
the U. S. fishermen seem trivial to them. 
The fishing strategies of coastal fleets and distant water fleets 
differ. The distant water fleets have, of necessity, a logistic system 
which allows them high mobility. They can go from place to place. They 
are not dependent upon maintaining in a viable condition a fish stock 
occuring in a particular geographic site. The Soviet Union in particular 
has adopted the strategy of "pulse fishing" in which they concentrate 
their efforts on one fish stock which is abundant at a particular place 
and time. They fish it down to the point that the catch no longer repays 
the harvesting costs and they then switch to another species and fish 
that one down. The biological theory behind pulse fishing (if there 
is any) is that if there are several species to run through, by the time 
the last is fished out, the first one will have recovered and will again 
support a fishery. Regretably this has not yet happened in .the case-of 
haddock which the Soviets overfished in 1965. Pulse fishing is not 
compatible with coastal fisheries which operate from the same ports trip 
after trip and year after year. As an example, if one of these highly 
mobile distant water fleets were to destroy (as they practically have) 
the stock of scup that the Hampton Roads trawl fishery has historically 
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operated on it would be of no great import to the distant water fleet; 
it could move on to another stock in another area. The domestic fleet, 
which is tied to a particular port of operation, could not move; it has 
nowhere else to go. 
In order to reach solutions to such problems, the party which feels 
that its ox is being gored must be able to provide something of value 
to win concessions. The distant water fishermen are not violating any 
law, although they are economically damaging nearshore participants in 
the fishery. So, when the United States attempted, through bilateral 
agreements to alleviate some of its fishery problems we had to give 
something in return. The amount of suitable trading material is 
limited. If there are more problems than there are trading materials, 
when your pockets become empty, you are still left with a number of 
social problems and a number of fish stocks which are not producing 
at the level that would be most economical. Additionally some nations 
seemingly expected the U. S. to pay them to fish rationally. Thus 
the regime of freedom of the seas was not satisfactory. Under it 
coastal fisheries were being severely disrupted and several stocks 
were being overfished. Therefore, the U. S. is establishing a more 
effective regime. Undoubtedly the new regime will not solve all of 
the international and domestic fisheries problems. It will, however, 
make significant progress. 
Foremost among the problems and implications of the new fisheries 
regime will be allocation of the limited resources among the many who 
wish to harvest them. This issue, how to "slice the pie", will be 
contentious both domestically and internationally. We can expect con-
tention domestically over the question of whether or not there is a 
surplus of a stock which can be allocated to foreigners. This will 
be a critical problem. We can presume that there will be a tendency 
on the part of the United States industry to hold stocks to itself 
because the more dense a fish stock is, the cheaper it is to fish. The 
U. S. will be inclined to build up what will appear to the foreigners 
to be a large surplus. The foreigners, of course, will be placing 
pressure on us to make the largest possible quantity available for 
harvest. 
Once we determine domestically that surplus in some stock is 
available off our coast, how will the United States, through the State 
Department, allocate this to foreigners? Will we take the altruistic 
point of view that in a world suffering from protein. starvation, our 
surplus stock should be made available only to those; countries that 
have a severe protein malnutrition problem? Will we., on the other hand, 
merely put it up on the auction block? Will we involve fisheries in 
various other trade-offs, connnercial and political? Will access to 
fish be traded for so many cubic feet of natural gas or for access to 
certain military bases or for various other necessary inter-govern-
mental arrangements? 
A fisheries zone of 200 miles will necessitate negotiation of 
borders, not only with Canada and Mexico, with whom we share land 
borders, but also with a few other nations. Wherever a 200-mile zone 
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would impinge on the fisheries zone or other territory of another 
nation, a boundary must be negotiated. This aspect will involve 
dealing with Cuba and the USSR among others. This issue may become 
clouded by considerations other than fisheries. For example, petroleum 
and hard minerals may become involved. With regard to international 
allocation there are several problems that will be exciting and con-
tentious to address. 
As difficult as international allocation is going to be, I think 
domestic allocation will be even more problematic. We have chosen 
as our fisheries management goal optimum yield. Neither of the 
alternative goals, maximum sustainable yield or maximum economic 
yield, was politically viable. It was politically feasible to settle 
on optimum yield because the concept is so vaguely defined that each 
person contemplating it could interpret it as being favorable to 
his interests. It will be impossible to satisfy all interested parties. 
It will even be extremely difficult to have the various users of the 
resources equally dissatisfied, but perhaps that is the best that we 
can hope for. · 
By selecting optimum yield as our goal we have postponed making 
some difficult decisions. As we design and adopt management plans 
for the various fisheries we will find it necessary to more accurately 
define optimum yield in terms of allocations among user groups. Pre-
dictably, the fur will fly. In this question of allocation in fisheries 
management under the optimum yield goal the role of science will be 
smaller than it has normally been in fisheries. I refer primarily to 
international fisheries management in which the goal has been generally 
agreed upon to be maximum production of food. The goal has been relatively 
simple without involvement of a number of confusing social issues, and 
the strategy has been largely aimed at maximum sustainable yield of 
protein. With such differing economic schemes in different countries 
economic management has been little involved. I think that there will 
be a lessened role of classical fishery science in management. This, 
however, should not be looked upon as an undesirable development. The 
role will be reduced only relatively. Neither socio-economic factors 
nor political factors have played a large enough role in fisheries 
management to date and this has been one of the serious problems. The 
decisions to be made are indeed political in the best sense of the 
word. They are social decisions and therefore they must be made at 
the political level. There is no standard by which goals can be deter-
mined to be good or bad. A fishery can be managed for maximum sustain-
able yield. It can be managed to provide the maximum number of jobs. 
Similarly it can be managed in order that the participants reap a 
maximum profit. Conversely it can be managed so that maximum freedom 
of access is maintained. No one of these goals is inherently superior 
to the others politically, socially, or scientifically. Selecting from 
among the spectrum of goals requires, in my view, social decisions of the 
sort that should be made by political bodies. This is one of the things 
that disturbs me about the extended jurisdiction fisheries legislation 
now pending in the Congress. The hybrid bill that has emerged from 
H.R. 200 and S. 961 does not, in my view, set up a politically viable 
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mechanism for making some of the hard political decisions that must 
be made. I do not believe that the management counc:Lls which would 
be established have a broad enough social base to be capable, polit-
ically, of making these decisions. 
Similarly there are social decisions to be made regarding limiting 
entry. Fisheries management never regulates what the fish do, it 
always regulates what the people do. Therefore the decisions are 
social and political. The number of participants who are harvesting 
a connnon property resource can be limited. This has been rarely 
done up to this point in time but it is indeed possible to limit 
entry. As the number of participants is adjusted upward or downward 
the money made by the participants will increase or decrease. Society 
thus has the opportunity to manipulate the earnings of the participants 
in a fishery in an attempt to provide for a reasonable rate of return 
on capital invested and reasonable compensation for the workers. 
A new era in fisheries is upon us as a result of either or both of 
two actions now pending. The 'UN Law of the Sea ConfE~rence now in progress 
in New York is seeking a rational international regime. I doubt that 
agreement will be immediately forthcoming from this forum .. It now 
appears that the pending Fisheries Management and Conservation Act will 
pass Congress and be signed into law by the President. Therefore, the 
domestic management procedure and international allocation problems 
will be with us and they will require thoughtful, patient people to 
work out solutions. 
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Introduction 
A STATE'S VIEW OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION 
by 
James E. Douglas, Jr. 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission 
At the outset let me refer you to the title of this presentation 
and pointedly note that my remarks here today, both in the prepared 
text and any extemporaneous comments later, must be viewed in the 
light of my experience as Virginia's chief fisheries officer. My 
colleagues in other states might not share my views; and even if 
they did, I am sure their emphasis, priorities, and conclusions 
drawn are quite likely to differ from mine. In addition, let me note 
that there are many aspects of extended jurisdiction and, time being 
limited, I have chosen only those aspects that I consider most salient. 
There is evidence of strong agreement among at least the East 
Coast states with regard to the principle of extended jurisdiction. 
In 1974 the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, consisting 
of 15 East Coast states from Maine to Florida, adopted a resolution 
calling for the passage of a bill that would extend the fisheries 
jurisdiction of the United States to 200 miles. Whil,e this .resolution 
dealt with only one method of extending jurisdiction, namely unilateral 
Congressional action, I feel confident in using it as an indication of 
the collective wishes of those states for extended jurisdiction. In 
fact, the only state to demur in that resolution explained that they 
were in favor of the concept but disagreed with the v,ehicle. We could 
indeed spend considerable time discussing the merits ,of the various 
ways of achieving extended jurisdiction, but in the interest of time I 
shall not attempt such here. It will, however, be necessary to note 
that two different approaches are in progress at the moment. 
First, however, consider the current legal and jurisdictional 
regime, wherein the United States adheres to a three-mile territorial 
sea. In short, the legal boundary of the United Stat,es extends three 
miles seaward; and this three-mile belt is considered also as the 
boundaries of the several coastal states. Thus Virginia's East Coast 
boundary, and of course jurisdiction, extend three miles seaward. In 
1966 the Congress, via P.L. 89-658, added nine miles to the Territorial 
Sea, called it the Contiguous Fisheries Zone, and declared unilateral 
15 
United States management of fisheries within that zone. One must note 
that the coastal states do not share in any authorities in the Contiguous 
Fisheries Zone. 
What is Extended Jurisdiction? 
As mentioned, there are two approaches currently in progress. 
Each would extend fisheries management jurisdiction to 200 miles, 
but each takes a different tack through a different forum. 
Unilateral extension is that term used to describe the 
Congressional action that has resulted in passage by both the Senate 
and House of separate bills that would create a new Contiguous 
Fisheries Zone to extend 197·miles seaward of the Territorial Sea. 
Add three to that and you get 200. These bills are very near their 
final massaging by the conference committee which is ironing out 
differences between the two versions. In fact, today's newspaper 
indicates agreement has been reached. 
The second approach is much more complex in that a 200-mile 
Economic Zone, which would include fisheries management, is proposed 
by the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (LOS) to be the 
standing international law. While there is general agreement among 
the 150 nations at that conference that fisheries management should 
extend to 200 miles, the conference is similarly dealing with so many 
other matters of intense concern that a comprehensive treaty may, indeed, 
be hard to come by. 
The problem, as seen by the states. 
In a word the problem was foreign fishing effort. Large fleets 
of efficient distant water vessels, led mainly by the Soviets, came 
to the northwest Atlantic off the shores of Canada and the United States, 
and with the highly predatory practice of "pulse fishing" on those 
historic high-yield areas, such as the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and 
George's Bank, soon began to deplete the stocks measurably. The United 
States first heard the cry from the New England fishermen, but as 
stocks became depleted in the Northwest the distant water fleets moved 
to the South. Evidence exists, and it was presented to the Congress, 
that Virginia's total landings, and landings per vessel, began to decline 
immediately after the foreign fishing effort moved into Virginia's off-
shore waters. An even more dramatic example is the correlation between 
the increased catch of river herring by foreign fishing vessels and 
the decreased catch of that same species within the Chesapeake Bay. 
But recognizing the threat presented by such unrestrained and 
irresponsible fishing was one thing; what to do about it was another! 
The United States t"isherman found himself in a dilemma; he is quite 
independent and is opposed to governmental regulation; but without 
governmental help, the foreign fishermen would ruin the stocks upon 
which the domestic fisherman depends. Faced with the choices of certain 
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biological depletion and economic destruction or governmental juris-
diction over these stocks, he and the states wisely chose the only 
hope available, Extended Jurisdiction. 
Although there is at present no extended jurisdiction of federal 
authority, the United States is not without certain ve~hicles that 
address the problem of foreign overfishing and conservation. These 
vehicles take the form of international agreements. Regrettably the 
success or failure of such agreements is directly proportional to 
the foreign nation's acceptance and understanding of the scientific 
data, and the degree of responsibility and willingness of the foreign 
nation to adhere to the terms of the agreement. Such agreements may 
be multi-lateral such as the eighteen-nation International Commission 
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), or as bi-lateral agree-
ments between the United States and one other nation. Several bi-lat-
eral agreements are in existence, the most notable examples being those 
with the Soviet Union and Poland. My personal experiemce with ICNAF, 
and with some of the bi-laterals, is that we have made~ significant 
strides in gaining agreement and acceptance of scientific data, but 
little progress has been made in the field of responsible attitudes. 
Perhaps this is a kudos to the scientists who say, above all, they 
are objective. At any rate I am certain that my observation is indeed 
an indictment of the bureaucrats and political leadership in the fisheries 
ministries of these foreign nations. 
If one finds no federal authority beyond 12 miles, other than 
that accorded by international agreement, then it come~s as no surprise 
when I say there is no state jurisdiction either. But that is not 
altogether true. There are certain devices available to states such 
as landing laws and the limited control a state has over its residents 
beyond the Territoral Sea. Landing laws are the best present approach. 
Examples would include prescriptions on allowable sizE~s, total catch, 
and seasons. Any truly effective state-oriented scheme almost always 
involves the necessity for uniform laws or regulations among the several 
states, and this has been extremely difficult to achieve. The bottom 
line of any state regulation is that it can deal only with the actions 
of United States fishermen and cannot hope to approach a solution to the 
real problem of regulation of foreign fishing effort. 
Thus I must conclude that none of the present approaches are 
capable of solving the probl~m. Mind you there is no inherent reason 
why international agreements could not be a solution, but a dramatic 
change in attitude would be required; and I do not seE~ that as 
happening--at least I am unwilling to take that chanc,~ if there are 
better approaches available. Clearly the states, singularly or 
collectively, are unable to present any solution. 
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Extended Jurisdiction as the solution. 
It must seem obvious to all of you by now that Extended 
Jurisdiction is designed to give us precisely what is missing--a 
legal regime that will cover most of the stocks important to United 
States domestic fisheries. I have no intention at this point to 
discuss the legal, ethical, or moral propriety of unilateral extension 
versus LOS extension. Indeed, I believe the difference between these 
two approaches is basically philosophical yet tempered with very real 
concerns over the most appropriate method and its impact on other United 
States' policies, and the policies of the other nation's toward the 
United States. At any rate I'll leave that subject for your noble 
minds to wrestle with in some of your informal discussions. When 
you all agree on the solution, I'm sure the Secretary of State would 
be interested in hearing from you. 
Lets first examine unilateral extension and its considerable 
state involvment. The current bill, if it emerges as I truly believe 
it will, will establish a unique state/federal partnership. States 
harbor a considerable amount of data and expertise in fisheries 
management, not the least of which is in evidence right here at the 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science. Collectively the states have 
more expertise than the federal government; and so it is not without 
reason that the bill will establish several Regional Councils on which 
state representatives will have voting power. I was informed yesterday 
that the National Marine Fisheries Service Regional Director may also 
have a vote in the final version of the bill. While the make-up of 
these Councils will vary, the Middle Atlantic Regional Council, which 
will include Virginia, will be composed of nineteen voting members, 
of whom eighteen will be state representatives and one a federal 
representative. Management programs developed by majority ·vote of the 
Regional Council will be reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce who may 
exercise a right to veto. But provision is made to override the veto 
by a two-thirds vote. I'll hazard a guess that any management plan 
agreed to by less than two-thirds of a Council is a poor plan per se, 
and might well deserve a veto. At any rate, the key point here is the 
clear-cut authority given to the states through the Regional Councils 
to develop fisheries management plans in the newly expanded Contiguous 
Fisheries Zone. 
Management plans having cleared this quasi-legislative route will 
then be translated into regulations and will run through the normal 
administrative procedures for federal rule making, and will thus become 
in effect federal law. Primary enforcement responsibility will fall 
to the Coast Guard, although there is talk of deputizing state law 
enforcement officials to assist. 
But lets not lose sight of the problem--foreign fishing effort. 
It is not quite clear to me at this time how Regional Councils will 
approach this. There is general, but far from unanimous, agreement that 
the doctrines of "optimum utilization" and "coastal state's preference" 
will be the controlling doctrines ("state" as used here is synonomous 
18 
with nation). The United States would determine the total allowable 
catch of a species, assign to its domestic fishermen whatever portion 
of the total allowable catch they can take and use (it might be all), 
then assign the remainder to foreign users. In any event, whatever 
doctrine emerges, it is clear to me that it must serve to reduce 
foreign fishing effort and restore the depleted stocks to, at, or 
near a maximum sustainable yield level. 
Several other key questions arise and serve to obfuscate the 
states' role in unilateral extension of jurisdiction. I have already 
mentioned the voting procedure, whereby it would be possible for 
several states to gang up on one or two states to pass a managment 
scheme that would regulate a species indigenous primarily to the 
minority states. 
There is also a statement regarding the right of the Secretary 
of Commerce to prepare federal management plans when the states do 
not do so on a timely basis. This increasingly familiar caveat in 
federal law is particularly offensive to me in that for all practical 
purposes it serves to void any authorities granted to the states. 
Succinctly it says, "I will allow you to do it, so long as I am in 
agreement with the way you do it." Perhaps in the subject legislation, 
we have a better than usual system of checks and balances; and besides, 
my experience with fisheries management personnel in. other states and 
at the federal level has been most cordial and most agreeable. 
Embodied in the language -is a strong hint that the Councils, or 
the federal government through its pre-emption provisions, will be 
able to regulate fisheries within the Territorial Sea, an area hereto-
fore considered soley the state's domain. A state's interior waters, 
such as the Chesapeake Bay, will not be pre-empted so I am told. 
Whether this federal pre-emption in territorial wate:rs is new via this 
bill, or has always been in existence, might be answered in a present 
case before the United States Supreme Court, styled James E. Douglas, Jr., 
Commissioner v. Seacoast Products, Inc. et al. You might wish to 
follow the Court's ruling should the case be accepted. 
Another problem to be faced is how to handle the interim between 
the effective date of extended jurisdiction and the promulgation of 
management regulations for a given species or stock. Clearly no one 
expects the Councils to perform instantaneous manageiment of all species. 
Already some thoughts are in progress to have ICNAF address this problem. 
But what if the second alternative of international agreement via 
the Conference on Law of the Sea should become a reality? I am of the 
opinion that such a happening will change little, H any, of what I 
have previously discussed. First, the unilateral extension bills pro-
vide that it shall be the law until the United StatE!S ratifies any 
Law of the Sea Treaty that deals with exte.nded fisht~ries management. 
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In modern day parlace, the law will self-destruct in favor of an LOS 
agreement. Secondly, and here I am subject to correction by counsel, 
I am of the opinion that the effect of an LOS treaty will be agree-
ment by the nations that each coastal nation has a 200-mile zone for 
fisheries management and the right to regulate within that zone. It 
seems a simple parliamentary matter to transfer the same institutional 
arrangements from domestic regulation gained through unilateral exten-
sion to domestic regulation gained through LOS. But, this problem 
may be academic, for the President has indicated he wishes to delay 
the effective date of unilateral extension until after the present 
session of the LOS conference just begun this week. Thus an LOS 
solution might pre-empt any unilateral action. 
Conclusions 
Most domestic fishermen want unilateral extension. Most states 
have supported unilateral extension. I believe the reasons for this 
position are many-fold; but primary are 1) we understand domestic law 
better than international law, 2) we trust domestic law more than 
international agreements, 3) we feel domestic law is more adaptable 
and more quickly adjusted than international law or international 
agreements, and 4) domestic law is more likely in fact to occur than 
is a LOS treaty. 
Under present unilateral extension bills, states will have the 
primary role in developing fisheries management plans; however there 
are prescribed checks and balances against both the states and the 
federal establishment. 
Finally, and foremost, a legal regime will exist that will afford 
an opportunity to manage and conserve fish stocks adjacent to our 
nation's shores. 
With so much of the world being dependent upon the oceans and 
seas as a source for much needed protein, it is an opportunity that 
we must not fail to grasp, and it is a situation for which we must 
not fail to find a solution. 
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INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION 
by 
Dr. Daniel Lecuona 
The World Bank 
One addition I would make to Professor Theberge's words of intro-
duction is that I am currently serving in the World Bank, an inter-
national institution which is probably best characterized as a financial 
arm of the United Nations system. This institution represents 130 nations, 
and its staff is made up of people from 80 different countries. So, in 
confronting the problem of freedom of speech, we arrived at a compromise: 
Whenever we speak, we have to'alert you that we speak neither for 80 
countries nor for 130 nations. In fact, I speak for nobody except for 
myself. As a result of which you may wonder what I am doing here I 
will try to provide some reasons for that. Having been preceded by three 
very scholarly discussions from distinguished Americans, I might discuss 
concepts that sound somewhat shocking or heretical. Perhaps the purpose 
of my presence here is to present the international aspects of today's 
topic from the perspective of an outsider who has seen many issues debated 
and defended from more than one. side and who as an -international civil 
servant, thi'nks it is his duty to try to reconcile· those many sides into 
some connnon understanding. 
Now I myself happen to be a lawyer who no longer practices law. 
Not that I had any problems with the bar; I'm just having more fun doing 
something else. As a former law student, it comes to my mind that some 
of you here may never hear about fisheries again and it is just as well; 
but others who will, whether as lawyers, or as offici.als of government 
agencies, or as representatives of fishing interests, will have to take 
sides and will have to make choices. In that process, any dedicated 
individual tends to identify with his own side much to the detriment of 
his perception of what is on the other side. Having served now for a 
number of years in an international institution has e.xposed me to that 
kind of situation and has given me the privileged opportunity to look 
at both sides all the time. 
Any attemptat reconciling conflicting views has to begin with a 
realistic appreciation of the differences between the: parties. In the 
matter at hand today, one of the greatest problems is that of reconciling 
what I would call almost isolated legal systems. The: United States 
operates on what is known basically as the common la~, system which, though 
it may surprise you, puts your country in the minority of the world. 
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Most other nations,including the Soviet Union, operate under what is 
known as the civil law or Roman law system. That immediately produces 
a typical instance of the cultural gap in international law. 
In the same fashion, one would have to take stock of factors that 
shape the law rather than being shaped by it. Fishing, though under-
taken to produce food, is in its first stages a business activity, 
which means money to many people in different ways. The question of 
extended jurisdiction has a lot to do with war, which is a very primitive 
way of doing business. I am referring to an activity known in the late 
Middle Ages as privateering which was partially condoned by international 
law, provided it was done beyond three miles off the coast. One of the 
suspected origins of the three-mile rule is that as long as coastal 
defenses could reach a ship within three miles, all nasty business 
better be done beyond three miles. Sucb was business in those days. 
Naturally each country always looks first upon its own interest, and it 
might as well do so. Of course, the relative weight and might of each 
country adds a special significance to that attitude. Therefore, the 
conflict was not confined to the academic context in which we can dis-
cuss it today, but it took much more complicated forms. These factors 
have influenced international law from its very origins and cannot be 
ignored. 
My co-panelists were generally happy that the United States is 
considering expanding its fisheries jurisdiction. You might be surprised 
to hear that, though speaking from an international viewpoint, I am also 
very happy. Most other internationalists will probably wail about the 
United States finally giving up hopes of developing international law 
on this matter and joining the club of "sea grabbers". I am happy for 
an entirely different reason. About.eight years ago I was tnvolved with 
the 200-mile claim of a small nation known as Ecuador, which was in the 
habit of seizing California tuna boats every January. The prevailing 
view in the United States at the time was entirely different from every-
thing you have heard here today. Unilateral claims were naughty. The 
international law was a three-mile territorial sea and anyone making claims 
beyond three miles was violating international law. If one could not have 
uniform laws, the only way to solve the problem was through treaties. At 
that time, I wrote an article entitled "The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute" in 
which, much to the annoyance of some international scholars, I said that 
"in protecting their own interests, the larger maritime states would find 
it convenient to recognize the similar interests of smaller nations and 
from a practical viewpoint this may well be a possible avenue to mutual 
understanding". I am happy to see that some of the things which I pre-
dicted then are turning out to be true. Now, eight years later, we find 
the United States making an almost 180-degree turn on this matter.' I do 
not think the United States has betrayed its own ideals, but rather that 
the circumstances intervening in those eight years have made the United 
States aware of certain things of which other countries, like Ecuador, 
had become aware twenty-four years earlier. The seething dispute of a 
few years ago may disappear now that both countries are claiming the 
same number of miles. 
1 
Lecouna, The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute (A New Approach to an Old Problem) 
2 JMLC 91 (1970), 
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Because of the cultural gap I cited before, I think the first order 
of business should be to ensure that the terms which we use every day are 
effective tools for thinking in common rather than the source of further 
misunderstanding. The terms are deceptively uniform; they can be trans-
lated from English into any other language and yet will not have the 
same meaning. If I am going to make a contribution to bridging that gap, 
I think it is only appropriate that I try to make you, my American hosts, 
aware of the inherent dangers of certain words. 
Let me start with the term "sovereignty." If a country makes an 
exclusive claim to fisheries within a part of the high seas, is that 
claim tantamount to sovereignty or is it not? The Anglo-Saxon position 
adopted not only by the United States, but also by the U.K., Canada, 
Australia, and India, has been that this is not sovereignty. The U.S. has 
always referred to a "contiguous fisheries zone", first established in 
1964, with a breadth of nine miles added to the three-mile territorial 
sea. Now the zone would be 197 miles wide, which is just the difference 
between 200 miles and the three miles of territorial sea. However, the 
International Court of Justic'e, in settling the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries 
case in 1951, said that any claim of jurisdiction over a certain area of 
the sea, of whatever extent or type, or any attempt to exercise that 
jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereignty. Therefore, whether it is an 
unqualified, generalized claim of sovereignty, or whether jurisdiction 
is asserted just to regulate fishing, pollution, or any other activity, 
sovereignty is being exercised. This is how most of the rest of the 
world envisages these claims and that is why sometimes other countries 
say they claim sovereignty oveL 200 miles. The American legal mind 
reacts with shock, arguing that sovereignty applies only to the three 
miles; over the remaining 197 miles it is just a fishing rights claim. 
Another instance of certain words being fraught with inherent danger 
is found in the theory of natural resources conservation. As Mr. Brewer 
pointed out earlier, this theory started to become embedded in the body 
of the law with President Truman's conservation proclamation in 1945. It 
is amazing how topical his own words are today. It :is worth remarking 
that in 1945 the United States claimed the right to ,establish conservation 
measures applicable to areas of the high seas well b1eyond its three-mile 
territorial sea. At best, if there were legitimate :interests of other 
foreign fishermen, the United States would take them into account. Not 
surprisingly, this proclamation is one of the factors that led a number 
of other countries to start pushing their claims farther out. If the 
U.S. was doing it, why should not the others do likewise? Shortly there-
after, in 1949, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Coni1ention was signed. 
Quite logically perhaps, the three Latin American countries with the 
largest fisheries resources followed suit with the 1952 conference in 
Santiago de Chile, attended by Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, where they 
established a common conservation zone, which was as long as their com-
bined littoral and 200 miles wide. That is how the 200 miles became one 
of the new concepts of the dispute. I will return to the 200 miles figure 
later on. 
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There is also the question of the physical amount of space being 
claimed. Again the Anglo-Saxon system draws a distinction between the 
seabed and the water above it. Traditionally, it has been the United 
States' position that President Truman's 1945 proclamation over the 
continental shelf was not tantamount to a claim on the water above the 
shelf. And again that distinction was quite unintelligible and illogical 
to many countries in the rest of the world. Based on the Roman principles 
of property law, they accept the rather simplistic but very practical 
notion that property rights do not affect just a flat piece of the crust 
of the earth, but they go all the way below and all the way above that 
piece of land, creating a sort of imaginary cone from the outer reaches 
of the space to the center of the earth. How then could the United 
States claim that it owned the seabed and at the same time argue that 
it was not making any claim on the water above the seabed? There again 
develops a controversy where some people will say the United States is 
not sincere, is devious, or is trying to draw :Byzantine distinctions for 
its own interest. In fact, the root of the dilennna lies with England's 
straying away from Roman Law in the Middle _Ages. 
Some funny things happen to the fish as well. With such distin-
guished company in this panel, I hope that if I incur some scientific 
error, I may be excused on account of being a lawyer. Scientists classify 
fish in two very large categories called necton and benthos; necton being 
those which float between the surface and the bottom, and the benthos 
those which normally rest_ on the bottom. For instance, the tuna fish swims 
and so it is riecton, while the lobster and crab crawls and sits on the 
bottom. Therefore, he. who cla:f.ms rights on the continental shelf would 
have jurisdiction over the lobster and crab but not the tuna. Well, in 
the article I wrote, I cited two international agreements where lobster 
and crab are treated differently. There has been an agreem~nt between 
the U.S. and Japan over Alaskan crab which were said to be benthos, and 
they were ruled by the law of the seabed. And there has been an agreement 
between France and Brazil where it was recognized that every now and then 
lobster took short leaps and since they are not in contact with the bottom 
they must swim and go by the law of the water above them. Obviously, all 
this gets very confusing for people from different backgrounds. 
You may have read lately of another development; so-called "nodules" 
have been found on the seabed. These nodules are small accumulations of 
manganese which contain other minerals as well. Now, the technology has 
been found to scoop them up and exploit them connnercially. If these nodules 
do not jump, do not swim, but sit on, rather than under, the surface of the 
seabed, then this should make you wonder what legal regime should apply? 
As I understand it, these minerals have been washed through the siltation 
process by river waters out of the mineral deposits in the continent. Some 
countries take the view that if manganese is leaking from their own moun-
tains, it must be theirs, no matter how far in the sea it may be. 
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Now I would like to tackle another one of the great bones of con-
tention; namely, what should be the breadth of the tt~rritorial sea? I 
have made some cynical remarks about the origins of the three-mile rule 
but somehow this rule was variously accepted as long as it could be en-
forced. The history of Northern Europe is full of incidents between 
Denmark and Russia and between Holland and Norway and between England 
and everybody else. Granted, some of these countries were so close to 
each other that there was not room for much more than three miles any-
way. However, the consensus starts breaking down by the time of World 
War I. I will have to skip a number of specific cas,~s, but when the 
first Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea was convened in 1930, the 
reporter of the conference proceedings stated that it was obvious that 
there was no longer a consensus on what the breadth of the territorial 
sea should be under international law. As you see, the argument did 
not start yesterday, and it has been rather topical for the last 46 
years. Beside President Truman's twin Proclamations of 1945, there is 
another precedent for the 200-miles concept. During World War II, the 
United States convinced the other countries of the Wt~stern Hemisphere 
to create a so-called "neutrality zone" which was a modern-day version 
of the Monroe Doctrine to keep the German U-boats out of continental 
waters. At that time, the zone's limit was established 300 miles away 
from the coasto This is how American nations started getting the notion 
that the three miles did not make sense anymore for one reason or another. 
In 1958, another Geneva Conference managed to go as far as recog-
nizing as a principle the right of the coastal state to protect its 
natural resources. However, wh~n the Conference attempted to define 
how far that right should extend, it failed and there was no possible 
way of mending that. I have had the honor of working at one time for a 
distinguished American, Mr. Arthur Dean, who at that time served as the 
U.S. representative at the Geneva Conference. He summed up ·.the American 
position very candidly when he said: "The American position consists 
in keeping the territorial seas as narrow as possiblE~, and the high seas 
as broad as possible." From the viewpoint of a largE~ maritime power like 
the United States, it could not make better sense. Of course, that 
conflic.ted with everybody else's view. Of late, and this has become 
evident in the third Conference on the Law of the Sea that started in 
Caracas in 1974, a new trend has developed: if we cannot agree among 
ourselves on the breadth of our national claims, instead of trying to 
work things outward from the shoreline, why not define a core of inter-
national waters to be internationally managed as the common heritage of 
mankind? To many people, this resembles one of thosE~ family reunions 
with the lawyer, after Papa passed away, where all the heirs are sitting 
and talking about how to divide up the estate. As in those reunions, it 
is the poor members of the family who say "Nothing of the sort. Because 
we know who is going to get the largest share." In my view, this is why 
the Caracas Conference could not reach agreement, why agreement was not 
reached in 1975, and why some people are making gloorny predictions about 
the new effort that started about a week ago in New York. I am still 
very optimistic however, because once people start perceiving things 
through a common lens, they will find new ways to agree. It is, however, 
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not until they sit next to each other and look through that same lens 
that they will start having a relatively common perception which will 
permit them to work towards something mutually acceptable. 
Some.,people have been willing, in principle, to accept the notion 
of an economic zone extending many miles from the coast but have argued 
that 200 miles is exaggerated. Without trying to exhaust the subject, 
I would like to draw your attention to two facts. If people could agree 
to three miles, or even 12 miles, in the North Sea or in the Baltic Sea, 
it is because they have to coexist in a rather narrow maritime space. 
You could not possibly think of Denmark claiming 200 miles off its shores 
and jumping over Sweden. However, if you would look at the map and 
measure a claim of 200 miles off the west coast of South America, it is 
proportionately smaller than 12 miles around the coast of England. There-
fore, the "sea grabbing" argument has very little base. The second fact 
is a modern development and that is the modern fishing fleet. This is-a 
huge organization based on extremely advanced technology that can move 
and operate away from its home port for several months. I am not just 
talking about the traditional 'fishermen's journey like you read in the 
Bible. These fleets can stay at sea longer than a U-boat could in the 
Second World War. In the presence of that type of operation, 200 miles 
is nothinge Again, the 200 miles have to be looked at in relation to 
what modern technology permits today. 
The nagging question remains, why 200 miles? What is so magic about 
200 miles? Well, there is nothing magic about 200 miles. In the western 
coast of South America there happens to be a cold water stream called the 
Humboldt Current that runs northbound from the Antarctic. At about the 
latitude of Ecuador, there is a warm water current called the "Corriente 
del Nino" or the "Child's Stream". When the two streams co~ 'together 
and blend, there is a chemo-physical reaction which makes the Humboldt 
Current move towards the coast or away from the coast at different times 
during the year. Now, the maximum distance the Humboldt Current was 
found to move away from the coast was 200 miles. And it so happens that 
the tuna always swim into the Humboldt Current. So if a country were 
worrying about the tuna, it has to claim as far as the tuna or the Current 
would go. Hence the origin of the 200 miles claim. There is no reason 
why the rest of the world has now to claim 200, 188, 533 or any other 
number of miles. It has to be recognized that the 200-miles claim stem 
from the peculiar circumstances of three particular countries--Chile, 
Peru and Ecuador--which were concerned with a problem of their own. And 
this is why they always claimed they were doing nothing more than what the 
International Court of Justice said each country has the right to do; to 
fix its own zone based on the scientific and ecological realities of its 
own environment. If any of you have any doubts about the importance of the 
200-mile zone for those three South American countries, let me add a bit 
of information. In 1968 the British weekly The Economist was discussing, 
as it periodically does, England's little war with Iceland over cod. And, 
although some statistics cited earlier today may contradict me, The Economist 
remarked then that the total catch on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts 
of the United States was only 4% of the total world catch; whereas fishing 
off the coast of Peru, on the Pacific Ocean only and with a much shorter 
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shoreline accounted for 15% of the world catch. Litt.le wonder then that 
fishermen and governments got so overheated about th,~ 200-mile claims off 
the Peruvian, Chilean, and Ecuadorian coasts. I do not have to get into 
a big argument to demonstrate that people are getting hungrier by the day 
all over the world. Even in this privileged nation food is at a premium. 
As in many other instances in the history of mankind:, there will be dis-
putes. Lawyers will be called upon to sustain or to make a case for their 
countries and in this process they will be asked to justify 200, 300 or 
whatever number of miles is needed to preserve the catch for their own 
nations. 
I have said before that I consider some current events felicitous. 
And I would like to repeat this assessment in the face of some pious 
wailing over the alleged collapse of the international law of the sea. 
Presumably, this "collapse" occurs because each country is now acting 
unilaterally instead of relying on treaties. I have always questioned 
whether, in fact, international law was truly reflected by treaties, or 
whether they are merely the only tangible evidence of international law. 
I am using the word "law" in its highest and most commendable sense; law 
as the embodiment of certain principles of justice, law as a set of rules 
by which all of us would like to be governed, not just statutes, or mere 
positive law. If any such law can be established internationally, are 
the treaties the best vehicle? Let me just point a few counter arguments 
to that. In the first place, since the Middle Ages there have been all 
sorts of treaties recognizing fishing rights over more than three miles, 
even though most nations were claiming three miles for sovereign purposes. 
The treaty is primarily an ad hoc arrangement to be used for the purpose 
of settling a specific problem at hand which concerns two or more parties 
involved in the treaty. Consequently, it has become a rather frequent 
practice to include in the treaties a disclaimer clause to the effect that 
regardless of the treaty's provisions they are without prejudice to the 
sovereign claims of the parties on the sea waters. :Many times after I 
have finished reading one of those treaties, I draw the rather cynical 
conclusion that it settled nothing except the particular problem of the 
day. Of course, this is not really the embodiment of international law 
as so loftily defined earlier. 
Another frequent source of treaties has been the: well~known fact 
that people run out of annnunition or simply get bored. with shooting at 
each other. Those treaties are no more than the legal consecration on a 
document of what the peculiar state of the war was when the beligerants 
held their fire. I hope we can all agree that is not a good method of 
making law. Otherwise, international law would merely depend on how 
much I can clobber you before we sit down and sign a treaty. However, 
I can cite a number of treaties that are held to represent the interna-
tional law of the sea simply because they contain maritime clauses, even 
if these clauses were signed at gun point. Now, as everyone knows, that 
is not valid law in the U.S. or anywhere else. Whether agreement is 
reached with a knife at your throat or with a bomb on. your capital city 
is only a difference of scale. Basically I would not consider such a 
treaty a good source of international law. On the other hand, there are 
a number of other treaties that are good sources of international law, and 
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I think there are a number of dedicated lawyers, scholars, and govern-
ment officials throughout the world who deserve praise for having 
written or having strived to write good treaties, which are reflections 
of accommodating and approximating positions from which good law will 
emerge. What I would simply propose that everybody keep in mind is 
whether all treaties make good law, or whether this proposition is 
something to be taken with a grain of salt. I think this has a bearing 
on why countries like Ecuador and other small nations have a general 
attitude of mistrust towards treaties. Let me just give you two ex-
amples. In the North West Atlantic Fisheries Convention several large 
fishing powers sat together and, as early as 1949, agreed on conser-
vation measures, fishing stock management, etcetera. The same year, 
the United States signed shrimp conventions with Mexico and Costa Rica 
which went no further than stating that there was much to be studied 
before agreeing on any conservation measures. It seems logical that 
some small countries developed the notion that unless they had a fishing 
fleet as powerful and as active as their counterpart, they really did 
not stand to gain much out of a treaty but rather the contrary. 
This attitude deserves a little bit more attention and perhaps a 
broader scope of analysis. For instance!' what is the attitude with 
which people approach these problems? Mr. Douglas has dwelt on this 
point and I would like to add a couple of thoughts to his. We have 
the coastal fishermen, typically the New England fishermen and the 
Ecuadorian fishermen; but there are also the international fishermen , 
i.e., the Russian fishermen as seen by the New Englanders or, from the 
viewpoint of the Ecuadorians, tpe California fishermen. As you can see, 
within the United States, your own compatriots will have two approaches 
depending on what kind of trade they are in. Now imagine when that 
is multiplied on an international scale. I referred earlier to the 
question of the means at one's disposal, the research that goes into 
developing a fishery, the technology that goes into exploiting it 
profitably, and the capital required to do it. Again, there is often 
a dismal disparity between countries which has nothing to do with their 
geographical location next to a valuable fishery. From this viewpoint, 
the "sea grabbing" approach has been a peacetime reflection of the same 
attitude one takes during war: let's grab as much as possible so that 
by the time we sit down to negotiate we will bargain from a position 
of strength. Of course, this depends very much on the means at one's 
disposal to enforce one's claims and this has been demonstrated through-
out history. When Iceland started claiming 12 miles, she got into 
trouble with England who sent warships to waters Iceland claimed were 
hers. Iceland sent patrol boats, cut British nets and Britons and 
Icelanders shot at each other. That was until 1964, when England ex-
tended jurisdiction, excuse me, the "contiguous zone" to 12 miles 
and British complaints against Iceland stopped. Pretty soon though 
Iceland, again worried about overfishing, pushed the limit to 50 miles 
and the whole affair was reenacted. 
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In the case of Ecuador and the United States, the dispute took a 
completely different tack. Although there was a great disparity in 
naval power, the United States was not in the mood to send a naval 
squadron all the way to Ecuador to escort the San Die~go tuna fleet. 
On the other hand, Ecuador did not have enough boats to patrol their 
200-mile zone. This led, instead, to some funny stories. Let me 
just briefly refer to one where a fishing captain was seized and taken 
to court where he said: "Your Honor, I was exercising my right of 
innocent passage in the high seas and I cannot see the reason why I 
am detained." When it was the State's turn, the prosecutor called 
the captain of the patrol boat as a witness and he said: "Well, 
Sir, what happens is that the Ecuadorian Navy has such slow boats 
and poor training that it cannot check each trawler properly; instead, 
we have developed a number of assumptions in order to determine whether 
somebody is passing innocently or whether he is fishing. If we see a 
boat that looks like a trawler and it has net and other fishing gear 
out on the deck and a lot of birds flying behind, we assume the boat 
is fishing and we seize it. , We do not have much time~ for inquiries." 
So much for innocent passage.· You may by now have de~veloped a feeling 
that a good deal of what I am saying is sprinkled with the usual Latin 
flair for the colorful and the picaresque. So, I would like to quote an 
Australian, Dr. R. D. Lumb, who should not be suspected of the same 
penchant for the colorful. He said: "There are a multitude of con-
flicting interests involved between developed and developing nations, 
between deep-sea fishing nations and those who rely on coastal fisheries, 
between strategically advanced nations and those with only a primitive 
form of naval capacity. The at_tainment of international solutions is 
dependent on finding areas of agreement even at the stage of organizing 
an agenda for a fishery or ocean bed conference." One wonders if he 
did not have a crystal ball when he wrote in 1969: ' 11 If the; problems 
become really pressing, State inertia might be overcome and action may 
be speeded up to resolve the questions by resorting to international 
dialogue and, ultimately, reaching treaty commitments~" 
I would like to add something else. But, before~ I get into that 
I would like to apologize if what I say seems to have a certain offending 
ring. Because I feel a certain debt to the United States, I think it is 
only fair that you now be warned of certain problems into which you may 
run when this country extends jurisdiction to 200 miles. This is what 
I call fishing with a calculated risk. In 1954, Ecua.dor, Chile and Peru 
agreed on enforcement machinery and cooperation to implement their 1952 
claim over the 200-mile zone. In 1968, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives wrote a report on what had 
happened over those 14 years of conflict with those three nations. Accord-
ing to that Congressional report, it appears that in 14 years only 75 U.S. 
vessels were seized. The total fines imposed during that period by 
Columbia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru amounted to less 
than $500,000. In addition, the apparent policy of the American Tunaboat 
Association based in California was to pay the registration and license 
fees only when it was necessary to secure the release of the seized boat. 
Again on the basis of that report, in the 1961-1967 period, the average 
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license fees paid every year amounted to $10,000 and these costs were 
reimbursed to the fishing industry by the U.S. Government under the 
1954 Fishermen Protective Act. Now, compare these costs of trespassing 
with the return. According to the same report, the potential income of 
a tuna. vessel ranges between $1,500 to $2,700 per day, so the median 
average income of a tuna vessel would have been about $2,100 per day. 
The 75 vessels which were seized over 14 years would have made, as a 
whole, $160,000 per day. The seized vessels were detained on average, 
for four to five days. As a result, the amount of fines paid over those 
14 years represents the equivalent of about three days' income and the 
license fees paid per year would represent the equivalent of about .06 
days' income of those 75 boats. That is what I call the theory of the 
calculated risk: even if you get caught, it may still pay off. I think 
that the United States may now be confronted with the same attitude by 
those fishing within the 200-mile American zoneo 
One additional reason to feel optimistic about international 
agreement is the remarkable closeness of the Ecuadorian arguments to 
those being invoked here today. First of all, there is almost no 
continental shelf on the Pacific Coast of South America, so Ecuador 
cannot rely on the shelf claims to protect itR fisheriesn Secondly~ 
the interactions between oceanic streams which I have mentioned before 
produce this belt of 200 miles where nutrient substances are carried 
towards the surface of the sea because of the different temperatures in 
the water. The Ecuadorians say that the Humboldt Current creates an 
ecosystem in the adjacent sea while, at the same time, it creates very 
adverse geographical conditions.in the coasts of northern Chile, Peru, 
and part of Ecuador, which are notably barren and deserted. Those who 
have been there compare them to a lunar landscape. The Ecuadorians also 
argue that one reason there are so many nutrients in the Humboldt Current 
is that the rivers coming down the steep slopes of the Andes are washing 
those nutrients into the Pacific Ocean because current climate conditions 
do not permit the land to retain them. In effect, they say, out of 
our mountains comes the food that feeds the fish that somebody else is 
catching from our waters. So, if we actually feed those fish, they are 
legitimately ourso Sounds similar to the theory of the salmon spawning 
grounds, does it not? At the same time, Ecuador claims it is relying 
on Mr. Truman's doctrines; and if he said it was all right to do it, 
then we are just doing the same. But, they are prompt to add, the 
Ecuadorian claims do not in any way prevent the exercise of rights 
granted to other nations under international law, inasmuch as such 
claims allow navigation and flight over the ocean, submarine exploration, 
scientific investigation and fishing operations subject naturally to 
corresponding regulations9 In other words, since 1952 Ecuador has 
been repeating that claiming 200 miles for exclusive fishing rights is 
not a violation of international lawo 
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In the end, you may wonder if my whole purpose in speaking was 
merely to demolish laboriously arrived at concepts. Was I simply 
trying to be facetious, to be funny, or to make fun of what other 
people regard seriously? Well, I have heard too much heated argu-
ment; I have seen too many countries retaliating against each other 
where it hurts the most, even in areas totally unrelated to fisheries. 
I have seen much tension and much harm done, all unde1~ a self-righteous 
banner of patriotism on the part of whoever is doing ,ghatever he is 
doing to whomever he is doing it. I decided eight years ago, and 
still hold that view, to adopt a rather light and opt:lmistic attitude, 
since no one is absolutely wrong. In the words of om~ of my country's 
poets: "I've never seen a farmer putting grain outside his bag." 
Everybody has to work for his country and that is his duty as a govern-
ment official, as a diplomat, and as a law-abiding citizen. If every-
body starts with the notion that everyone else around a negotiating 
table is doing his own duty as best he can, I think the tone of the 
debate will be calmer. Trading accusations and blaming each other for 
all sorts of naughty things will not take us anywhere. More than con-
flict, what faces us is a great deal of misunderstand:lng. After re-
flecting for some time, I have arrived at a few conclusions which I 
would like to share with you. Number one, international law as it 
concerns territorial waters and fisheries in particular has not evolved 
from rules of reason or from legal principles as much as it has from a 
struggle between national interests where big and small nations alike 
pursue similar goals with the different means at their disposal. In 
the second place, the positions adopted by several nations vary according 
to strategic and economic considerations and their relative maritime 
and naval power. Thirdly, the width of the territorial sea, fishing 
zone or whatever other name you give to it, is unquestionably an un-
settled matter in international law. No legitimate claim can be made 
that international law prescribes any number of miles. Fourth, every-
body has come to recognize that the coastal states have undisputed rights 
over the fisheries in the adjacent sea; but whether there is an interna-
tional consensus as to the breadth of the area subject to such rights is 
still an open question. 
I would invite all of us to look at the historic record of past 
disputes and I submit that such a record offers a reasonable prospect of 
future acconnnodation between the parties once the large and the small 
countries begin to recognize the legitimate interests of the other. 
As far as we in this room are concerned, we will undoubtedly be called 
upon to advocate the righteousness of our own country'·s cause, either 
as lawyers, government officials or scientists. In the absence of a 
higher international institution, widely accepted to adjudicate the 
issues, we ought not to for get that every one of thos,~ issues will always 
have more than one side to be looked at. I trust I am justified in con-
cluding with an optimistic and hopeful note. Thank you very mucho 
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AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED EXTENDED JURISDICTION LEGISLATION! 
by 
Ivar Strand 
Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
The international acceptance of exclusive zone management, as 
expressed in the proposed extension of the U.S. fisheries zone, will 
inevitably create economic impacts throughout the fi.shing industry, 
the nation, and the world. This institutional change will fundamen-
tally alter the customs of seafood production and result in new eco-
nomic patterns, Incentives to produce, market channels and the compo-
sition of production are among the elements which will shift in response 
to extended jurisdiction. ,Although the changes will first appear only 
in the seafood industry, other industries will feel secondary impacts 
as they compete with fisheries products, provide capital to fishing 
firms or interact in a variety of ways. The entire international 
product flow will vary in the long run, and countries with small 
exclusive zones and substantial distant water fleets, such as Japan, 
will rely increasingly on other methods to provide their protein 
requirements. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate possible economic out-
comes of the proposed extended jurisdiction (EJ) legislation and 
evaluate its economic merits. Two basic concepts, efficiency and income 
distribution, are employed as criteria to judge the merits of the legis-
lation. Using the efficiency criterion, the first section contains a 
comparison of t~e exclusive zone approach (inherent in extended juris-
diction) with the current situation and management by a species approach 
(international agreements on individual species). These three alterna-
tives are then examined in the second section with regard to their effects 
on the national and international distribution of income. In the con-
cluding section, the author ventures the argument that.adoption of the 
exclusive zone is a rational economic choice for the United States. 
Before proceeding to the discussion, efficiency and distribution 
must be clearly defined. Distribution simply describes who receives 
income generated by production. An analysis of institutional change will 
generally suggest groups that are likely to benefit or suffer as a result 
of the change. Efficiency analysis asks whether production and distribu-
tion can be changed so as to monetarily benefit someone without monetarily 
injuring any other individual. An institutional arrangement is judged 
!support of this work came from the National Sea Grant Program Contract 
No. 04-6-158-44047. I wish to thank the National Oceani.c and Atmospheric 
Administration for providing much of the information contained in this paper. 
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efficient if it generates production and distribution which cannot 
be reorganized to aid someone without injuring anyone else. The 
practical criteria employed for efficiency is whether consumers value 
the last unit produced as much as the last unit costs to produce. For 
the fishery, the question is whether consumers value the last ton of 
fish caught as much as it costs to catch, in terms of actual production 
costs and, most importantly, the effect on future stocks. 
EFFICIENCY 
Current Situation 
Domestic fish stocks beyond the 12-mile contiguous zone can be 
classified as unmanaged or open-access resources. These coastal re-
sources are the property of no one and management becomes at most a 
volunteer effort. During some portion of their life cycle, the majority 
of fish inhabit areas where vessels can operate free of regulation. 
Within this economic climate, fishermen perceive their costs only in 
terms of operating expenses, aisregarding the future costs that current 
landings imply. This is completely rational, for if one fisherman con-
siders future effects there is no guarantee that other fishermen will do 
likewise. Even in the unlikely event that fishermen could reach consensus 
to decrease current landings, there are still enforcement problems and 
lack of legal barriers to prevent new entrants. Excess capacity, depleted 
fish stocks, and inefficient production are evident in the current situation. 
The numerous cases of depleted fish stocks (National Marine Fisheries 
Service 1975:76) are examples of current inefficiencies and overcapitalization. 
It has also been estimated that Pacific salmon landings could be achieved 
with $50 million less effort (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 1969:174) and 
North Atlantic cod with $50 to $100 million less effort (Ch~isty 1973:17). 
There are few, if any, highly priced species that are not overexploited. 
As an aside, it is noted that other serious institutional barriers 
exist which preclude efficier.t domestic seafood production. The U.S. Code 
(Title 46 §251 (a)), presumably in an attempt to preserve national ship-
building capabilities, states that "no foreign-flag vessel shall, .•• , land 
in a port of the United States its catch of fish taken on board such vessels 
on the high seas or fish processed therefrom ••• " As a result, domestic 
fishermen must buy U.S. built vessels and pay approximately 30% more, com-
peting at a significant disadvantage. This law also effectively prohibits 
the growth of domestic processing and distribution facilities. Foreign 
vessels out-compete domestic vessels and land much of our coastal production 
(e.g. 88% of East Coast haddock). This raw product cannot be landed until 
routed through a foreign port, unnecessarily raising the price of domestic 
raw product and limiting the growth of domestic processing facilities. One 
must question whether the shipbuilding industry is aided (there are fewer 
U.S. vessels given the competitive disadvantage) and, more importantly, 
whether the benefits of the law outweigh its costs. There are also similar 
inefficiencies in the tariff structure which must eventually be addressed. 
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Species Approach 
International dispute settlement is the primary obstacle to effi-
cient production under a species approach. Although the responsibility 
for fishery management decisions rests with the coastal state, appeals 
on the decisions are referred to the World Court. Costly negotiations, 
determination of allocations, and continuing administration of appeals 
are a burdensome expense. 
Secondly, the World Court recognizes the full utilization concept 
as an accepted practice using the species approach and could force U.S. 
into use of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of a single species as its 
sole objective. For any species that is not harvested at MSY, the custom 
is for coastal states to avail the difference between MSY and the har-
vest to non-coastal states. This could force the U.S. into a single 
management objective, maximum sustainable yield, at a sacrifice of 
economic returns. A study of the New England yellow-tail flounder 
industry (Gates and Norton 1974:13) demonstrated that an additonal 
$5 millon in national income could be generated by regulating to achieve 
economic efficiency instead of MSY. That is, some of the capital and 
manpower that would be needed to catch MSY could be r·edirected into other 
activities that returned a higher dollar value ($5 millon in the yellow-
tail case) to the nation. 
Other costly inefficiencies arise from decisions based solely on 
full utilization of each species rather than a multi-species approach. 
Two examples, George's Bank haddock and California anchovy, illustrate 
this point. Despite the depleted status of George's :Bank haddock stocks, 
a decision to fully utilize cod on George's Bank would imply that haddock 
stocks would never be restored. Incidental catch of haddock by vessels 
seeking cod prohibit sufficient restraint on the haddock stocks. The 
economically efficient solution might be to restore haddock stocks at 
the expense of current cod landings. Similarly, decisions based on full 
utilization of California anchovy would mean significant decreases in 
sport fish which forage on anchovy. Under the present concept of species 
management, there is no consideration of multi-species problems. 
Exclusive Zone Approach 
Sole ownership (Scott 1955) is the most commendable aspect of 
exclusive zone management from an efficiency standard. Responsibility 
for the determination and allocation of allowable effort, enforcement of 
rules and the appellate procedures rests entirely with the coastal state. 
Although it is possible to abuse this authority, an e:Eficient use of the 
resources in the exclusive zone is also a possibility. 
Coastal states cannot ignore the future costs cr1~ated by current 
uses of fish stocks because these costs will be borne by them. The 
costs of depleted stocks are internal to the coastal state and prudent 
decision making will consider them. 
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Further, except for Constitutional considerations, there are no 
customs inherent in exclusive zone management that could restrict 
goals to narrowly defined objectives like MSY. Problems of multi-
species management could conceivably be addressed by the coastal state. 
Administration and enforcement costs should also be minimized 
by adoption of the exclusive zone approach. The costly administration 
of dispute settlement should be significantly reduced because decisions 
need not be reviewed in an international forum. Enforcement costs, 
especially those incurred when allocations are exceeded, may fall 
substantially. Furthermore, there is nothing to preclude consideration 
of enforcement cost in the determination of methods .and .goals of. :ma~gement. 
An outstanding example of this form of management is the 
International Fur Seal Convention of 1911. Except for the poor 
publicity regarding the method of capture, the treaty has been judged 
to be very successful (Christy and Scott 1969) and even Wesley Marx 
in The Frail Sea stated "No other marine creature has been placed 
under such rewarding management." The U.S. and the Soviets simply 
share the exclusive zone and.proceeds from the catch. 
To an economist concerned about efficient use of marine resources, 
there is optimism about the exclusive zone concept--at least there is 
a possibility for rationality to prevail. 
DISTRIBUTION 
National Considerations 
The enactment of exclusive zone management will provide windfalls 
to some individuals and may cause hardships to others. This section 
presents an analysis of those changes with emphasis on overall national 
gains and the regional aspects of the gains. To examine these issues, 
reference to a document prepared by the National Marine Fisheries 
Service from eight studies conducted for the federal government is 
frequently drawn. Due to the great uncertainties underlying the 
entire analysis, I would be remiss if I did not state that the values 
shown have wide variance. 
To examine overall gains, it is useful to classify domestic 
landings according to species habitat: Coastal Domestic, Anadromous, 
Oceanic Distant Water and Coastal Distant Water. Coastal domestic 
species inhabit the region within 200 miles of U.S. coast (cod), 
anadromous species are spawned in domestic waters and outside 200 miles 
offthe U.S. coast (salmon), oceanic distant water species migrate out-
side 200-mile zones (tuna), and coastal distant water species inhabit 
areas within 200 miles of other countries (shrimp). Within these 
classifications it is possible to see how the three institutions 
(Open Acces~, Specie~ Approach, Exclusive Zone) might affect our 
animal national· income (table 1) by the year 1982. 
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Coastal 
Anadromous 
Oceanic Distant 
(Tuna) 
Coastal Distant 
TABLE 1 
POTENTIAL NATIONAL GAINS OR LOSSESJV 
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
Current Species 
Situation Approach 
0 52.5 
-(35 to 50) -(35 to 50) 
-37.5 -37.5 
-22.2 -14.8 
(Shrimp/Lobster 
Exclusive 
Zone 
890.5 
-(35 to 50) 
-37.5 
-22.2 
1/ Taken from Summary of The Impact of The Species Approach and 
Exclusive Zone Upon Major U.S. Fisheries. Pg. 5. 
37 
w 
00 
REGION 
North East & 
Middle Atlantic 
South Atlantic 
& Gulf 
Pacific 
Coast 
Total 
TABLE 2 
POTENTIAL VALUE OF COASTAL R¥S9YRCES 
UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES-~-
1972 Species Approach Exclusive 
116 141.0 285 
230 253 445 
47 52 513 
393 445 1,243 
l/ Excludes menhaden, oysters, clams, and some crabso 
Zone Surplus 
169 
215 
466 
840 
2/ Excerpts from Summary of The Impact of The Species Approach and Exclusive 
Zone Upon Major U.S. Fisheries. Pg. 11. 
First, consider landings classified as coming from domestic coastal 
species. Here, value of landings are estimated to remain stable under 
the current regime; reductions in landings from overfishing are offset 
by discovery of new resources. My personal feeling is that this is an 
optimistic estimate. With the species approach, there is reason to 
believe that management will improve landings so that value of landings 
will rise by $52.2 million per year by 1982. However, the exclusive 
zone management through phase-out of foreign fleets will gain an 
additional $890.5 million annually. It is clear that national gains 
from coastal species are greatest under exclusive zone management. 
The surprising fact is that the gains from exclusive zone 
management are equally distributed regionally (Table 2). Northeast 
and Middle Atlantic fishermen, the most pro-EJ group, may increase 
their landings under EJ by about $150 million. However, the South 
Atlantic Gulf region can gain in the order of $200 million and the 
Pacific coast about $450 million. The gains in the Northeast would 
come from hake, cod, flounder, mackerel, herring, and squid, in the 
South Atlantic from coastal pelagics, croaker, and spot, and on the 
Pacific coast from pollack, liake, anchovy, and ocean perch. 
The anadromous stocks are likely to suffer substantial losses 
within any of these institutional arrangements (Tabl,e 1). The most 
important anadromous stocks are the Pacific coast salmon, which migrate 
far outside the 200-mile zone. Japanese or Soviet fleets can easily gain 
access to them now or in the future. Although there is an argument 
that Japanese fleets will be more prone to use fleets excluded from 
200-mile zone for anadromous species, there is also reason to believe 
that these fleets will eventually seek anadromous stocks anyway. The 
exclusive zone might be advantageous from the standpoint that U.S. 
pollack stock under the extended zone could be traded to Japan for 
assurances against landings of salmon. Obviously th,e Pacific Northwest 
will be hurt the most by foreign landings of anadromous species. 
All economically important oceanic distant water species are 
tuna. Because of the great range these species inhabit, it is unlikely 
that management can result without international agr1~ement. The loss 
of $37.2 million (Table 1) is an estimate based on the premise that an 
international agreement will be reached and the U.S. will reduce tuna 
landings by about 1/3 regardless of our domestic reg:ime. This is an 
extremely speculative estimate and is offered mostly for disc~ssion. 
The final category is coastal distant water species such as shrimp 
and lobster. U.S~ fleets are currently operating in British Guianas 
and Brazil under a zonal approach, and it is likely that major changes 
wi.11 occ:u,:- here~ The Mexican situation is in flux and there is likeli-
hood we would lose six to seven percent of total U.S. landings; this 
would occur in the Brownsville area causing a $22 million loss. 
Potential national gains under EJ from the harv1~sting sector alone, 
even under most dismal assumpt:i.ons, should be in the order of $200 million. 
39 
International Effects 
Let me briefly touch on one major international consideration, the 
phase-out of countries with large distant water fleets. It is estimated 
that the Soviet Union has 37% of its protein diet supplied by seafood 
products, and the majority of those landings come from outside 200-
miles off its coast. As these large fleets are forced from coastal 
states'exclusive zones, there must be severe repercussions within 
countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union. 
One outcome of the phase-out will probably be foreign investment 
in coastal states, essentially a rush to get within the protected 
zone. This has happened already on the West Coast as Japanese firms 
have invested in many Alaskan processing facilities. Our distant 
coastal water fleets (shrimp) have also invested in Central America. 
It will heighten in the near future and undoubtedly bring outcries 
from domestic fishermen to place restrictions on foreign investment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that extended jurisdiction 
offers the opportunity for potential economic improvement in domestic 
fisheries. However, this will only become a reality if an active, 
thoughtful management regime emerges from the legislation. 
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